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CONTRACTING FOR SUSTAINABLE SURFACE
MANAGEMENT
Tara Righetti*
INTRODUCTION
Oil and gas development is highly regulated. Operators
must comply with state and federal environmental laws to
protect clean water, endangered species, and historical and
cultural resources. State conservation laws regulate well
spacing, setbacks from lease lines and occupied structures,
permitting requirements, and operational rules, whereas local
rules may impose additional restrictions. 1 Operations on federal
lands are subject to the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act, onshore orders governing surface
use, and rules for waste prevention and hydraulic fracturing. 2
These public governance mechanisms materially influence
surface use, mitigation and reclamation and have greatly

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law, and Director of
the academic program in Professional Land Management, University of Wyoming School
of Energy Resources. This research was made possible through support from the National
Science Foundation EPSCoR program (NSF EPSCoR grant OIA-1632899) and the Charles
Koch and David True Foundations. I received valuable comments on this research during
the University of Arkansas Law Review Symposium on Environmental Sustainability and
Private Governance. Madeleine Lewis (J.D./M.A. 2018) provided excellent research
assistance. I thank the editors at the Arkansas Law Review for their editorial assistance. I
am deeply grateful to the numerous oil and gas companies and landowners who shared
with me copies of surface use agreements and welcomed me onto their ranches and
operations, and in so doing, made this research possible and enjoyable. The conclusions
and findings reported here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of Koch and True Foundations or the National Science Foundation. Any errors or
omissions are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. Jan G. Laitos & Elizabeth H. Getches, Multi-Layered, and Sequential, State and
Local Barriers to Extractive Resource Development, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2004); Riley
W. Vanham, A Shift in Power: Why Increased Urban Drilling Necessitates a Change in
Regulatory Authority, 43 S T. MARY’S L.J. 229, 248-54 (2011) (describing local oil and gas,
zoning and subdivision ordinances regulate operations within municipal limits).
2. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3160.0-1, 3160.0-3 (2017).
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reduced the environmental impacts of hydrocarbon
development.
It is against this background of public governance that
split-estate landowners and energy developers negotiate terms of
surface use and compensation for damages. The resulting
agreements fill in the gaps and complement public governance
mechanisms. As such, surface damage agreements are a highly
adaptable and effective private governance instrument to
promote site-specific surface management plans and
environmental behavior and best practices.
This article examines the surface damage agreement as an
instrument of private governance. Part I describes split-estate
ownership of oil and gas and the historic dominant-servient
ordering of the mineral and surface estates. Part II explores the
rebalancing of power effectuated by split estate acts and
statutory requirements to contract for surface damages in both
state and federal law. Part III examines the surface damage
agreement and provides a catalog of common environmental
provisions and covenants within those agreements. Part IV
analyses surface damage agreements within the framework of
private governance instruments, identifying their benefits and
exploring the limitations of reliance on individual surface
owners to promote surface management best practices. Part V
identifies opportunities to increase the governance function of
surface damage agreements through the incorporation of thirdparty standards and verification and explores the potential of
other private governance instruments to influence upstream
surface management practices.

I. SPLIT ESTATES
Split estates result when the minerals are severed within a
tract of land and separate parties own the mineral and surface
estates.3 These configurations exist throughout the United
States and include parcels with federal surface and private

3. Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 598 (1893). Although surface
rights are referred to as the “surface estate,” the “surface” owner also has a property
interest in the non-mineral components of the subsurface, including the pore space. See
Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803, 810
(2013).
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minerals,4 private surface and federal minerals, 5 or separate
private ownership of both estates. 6 Development of the minerals
often requires use of and damage to the surface of the land.
Although the methods of development have changed
significantly, conflicts among split estate property owners about
the permissible extent of surface use and claims for
compensation for damages resulting therefrom are as present in
2017 as they were in 1928. 7
State and federal courts have ordered the mineral and
surface estates according to a dominant-servient paradigm
wherein severance of the mineral estate gives rise to an implied
easement in the mineral owner to use the surface. 8 This
arrangement derives from the very nature of the severance itself:
without rights of surface use the underlying severed minerals
would be worthless.9 While mineral rights holders do not
strictly meet the common-law requirements for implied
easements of necessity, courts have nearly universally construed

4. See Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2011);
Andrew C. Mergen, Surface Tension: The Problem of Federal/Private Split Estate Lands,
33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419, 425, 428-29 (1998). The Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) estimates that there are approximately 58 million acres of split estate federal
minerals in the United States. BLM Facts: Subsurface Acreage Managed by the BLM,
BUREAU L AND MGMT. (June 15, 2011), https://www.blm.gov/nhp/facts/acres.htm
[https://perma.cc/CNQ8-A85K].
5. See Watt v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 37, 47-51 (1983).
6. See A-W Land Co. v. Anadarko E&P Co., No. 09-cv-02293-MSK-MJW, 2017 WL
1023375, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2017).
7. See Kinney-Coastal Oil Co v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 490 (1928); Entek GRB,
LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1253 (10th Cir. 2014); Steed v. Endeavor
Energy Res., No. CIV 09-1084 RB/GBW, 2010 WL 11452553, at *1 (D.N.M. Dec. 10,
2010).
8. Kinney-Coastal, 277 U.S. at 504-05; Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d. 1232, 1245 (D. Wyo. 2005); see also 4 NANCY SAINT-P AUL,
SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 41:2 (3d ed. 2017); Phillip William Lear & Stephanie BarberRenteria, Split Estates and Severed Minerals: Rights of Access and Surface Use After the
Divorce (and Other Leasehold Access-Related Problems), in JOHN C. LACY, THE SECOND
TWENTY-F IVE YEARS: A H ISTORY OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L AW
FOUNDATION 10-1, § 10.02(3)(d) (2004); Bruce M. Kramer, The Legal Framework for
Analyzing Multiple Surface Use Issues, 44 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. FOUND. J. 273, 274
(2007); K.K. DuVivier, Sins of the Father, 1 TEX. A&M J. REAL PROP. L. 391, 396-98
(2014).
9. Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1943).
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a grant or reservation severing the minerals to include the rights
of surface use for access and enjoyment of the minerals. 10
The implied easement of surface use can be understood as a
“property-rule.”11
Dominant-servient ordering assures
continuing rights of access and use by the mineral owner, thus
protecting the mineral owners’ basic incidents of ownership and
establishing the foundation for contracting among surface and
mineral owners. 12 As a property rule, which some courts have
even interpreted to be a rule of contract, 13 the implied easement
empowers a mineral owner to protect its rights of access. It can
accordingly enjoin a surface owner’s interference with its
operations 14 and, if needed, damage or even destroy the surface
property in order to access its property. 15
The relationship, however, is more multidimensional than
this ordering implies. 16 Courts have limited the uses permitted
under the implied easement to those that are reasonably
necessary to the extraction of the underlying minerals, 17 relate to
the primary purpose of obtaining production, 18 and are not for
the benefit of extra-lateral parcels.19 Thus, use of the surface for
production facilities, roads, flow lines, tanks, or disposal
operations that benefit multiple leases within a field may be an

10. Kramer, supra note 8, at 275-76; Richard T. Miller, A Mineral Owner’s Implied
Rights to Use Surface Property Owned by Others, 32 ENERGY & MINERAL L. INST. 203,
205 (2011); John S. Lowe, The Easement of the Mineral Estate for Surface Use: An
Analysis of Its Rationale, Status, and Prospects, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROCKY
MOUNTAIN MINERAL L AW T HIRTY-N INTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 4-1, § 4.02, at 4-3 (Rocky
Mtn. Mineral L. Found. 1993).
11. Rule, supra note 3, at 810; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 715, 715-16 (1996).
12. For a description of property rules in the energy context, see Rule, supra note 3,
at 806-08.
13. See generally Kramer, supra note 8.
14. Douglas R. Hafer et al., A Practical Guide to Operator/Surface-Owner Disputes
and the Current State of the Accommodation Doctrine, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 47, 53
(2010).
15. Id. at 65.
16. See id. at 49.
17. See Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553, 555 (Miss. 1962); Warren
Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1957).
18. Gill v. McCollum, 311 N.E.2d 741, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
19. Russell v. Tex. Co., 238 F.2d 636, 642 (9th Cir. 1956); Robinson v. Robbins
Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867-68 (Tex. 1973).
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impermissible surface use based on an implied easement. 20
However, where a use is both reasonable and related to the
production-underlying minerals, under the traditional dominantservient ordering the mineral owner may proceed with the use
irrespective of the damage caused to the surface parcel. 21
A growing number of states have also adopted a doctrine of
accommodation.22 Originally recognized in the Getty Oil case in
1971, the accommodation doctrine frames the mineral owner’s
rights of use as non-absolute and as owing due regard to the
interests of the surface owner. 23 In states adopting the
accommodation doctrine, the scope of the implied easement may
be determined based on a multidimensional “balancing of
seemingly competing and co-equal” or “correlative rights” of the
surface and mineral owners. 24 Each has rights within the surface
and subsurface property and the use of one may be bounded by
the use of the other.
Practically speaking, the accommodation doctrine requires
the mineral owner to use “available non-interfering and
reasonable ways and means of producing the minerals which
would permit the surface owner to continue his existing use of
the surface.”25
Accommodations that make drilling or
20. See Gill, 311 N.E.2d at 743; Dick Props., LLC v. Paul H. Bowman Trust, 221
P.3d 618, 621 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010); Farragut v. Massey, 612 So. 2d 325, 330-31 (Miss.
1992).
21. Hafer et al., supra note 14, at 65.
22. See Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 891, 511 S.W.2d 160,
163 (1974); Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 919 (Colo. 1997); Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894, 896 (N.M. 1985); Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh,
283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex.
1971); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976); Buffalo Mining Co.
v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1980); Mingo Oil Producers v. Kamp Cattle Co.,
776 P.2d 736, 740 (Wyo. 1989). Other states that “may be leaning to the multidimensional
‘reasonable accommodation’ doctrine” include Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Kansas. See
PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS O IL AND GAS L AW §
218.8, at 244, 244 nn. 9.12-9.13 (2008) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MEYERS].
23. Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 621; JAN G. L AITOS, Literature Review of Severed
Minerals, Split Estates, Rights of Access, and Surface Use in Mineral Extraction
Operations, in SEVERED MINERALS, SPLIT ESTATES, R IGHTS OF ACCESS, AND S URFACE
USE IN MINERAL EXTRACTION OPERATIONS 1B-1, 1B-1 (Rocky Mtn. Mineral L. Found.
2005) [hereinafter SEVERED MINERALS].
24. Kramer, supra note 8, at 301, 311.
25. City of Lubbock v. Coyote Lake Ranch, 440 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. App. 2014).
For a sampling of opinions adopting a common law doctrine of accommodation, see, e.g.,
Diamond Shamrock Corp., 511 S.W.2d at 163; Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Pawnee-Tulsa
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operations less convenient or more expensive are not per se
unreasonable, although the surface owner retains the burden of
proof.26 In some states, this burden may include a requirement
that the surface owner demonstrate that it has no other
reasonable alternative to conduct its operations. 27 Thus, rather
than permitting all reasonable uses, the accommodation doctrine
instead protects the surface owner from “unnecessary injury.” 28
Importantly, the accommodation doctrine does not undo the
basic dominant-servient ordering of the mineral and surface
estates.29 The surface owner may not block operations where no
reasonable method of accommodation is available. 30
The surface owner’s use of its property may likewise be
limited to those uses that do not unreasonably interfere with
existing oil and gas operations. 31 Mineral owners may enjoin
those uses that interfere with oil and gas operations or obtain
access to the surface over the objections of the surface owner.32
Mineral owners have not been successful, however, in blocking
uses of the surface in anticipation of future development
conflicts.33 In Osage Nation ex rel. Osage Minerals Council v.
Wind Capital Group, an oil and gas lessee attempted to enjoin
use of the surface based on the claim that development of the

Petroleum Co., 127 P. 252, 253 (Okla. 1912); Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 621; Getty Oil Co.
v. Royal, 422 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
26. Hafer et al., supra note 14, at 58-59; Will Russ, Inheriting the Wind: A Brief
Guide to Resolving Split Estate Issues When Developing Renewable Projects, in
RENEWABLE ELECTRIC ENERGY L AW, DEVELOPMENT, AND INVESTMENT 5-1, 5-8 (Rocky
Mtn. Mineral L. Found. 2013).
27. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248-50 (Tex. 2013); Courtney
R. Potter, Comment, The Accommodation Doctrine Revisited: Implications in Law and in
Policy, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 75, 76 (2014).
28. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norvell, 240 P.2d 80, 82 (Okla. 1952).
29. Christopher M. Alspach, Surface Use by the Mineral Owner: How Much
Accommodation Is Required Under Current Oil and Gas Law?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 119
(2002); Andrew M. Miller, Comment, A Journey Through Mineral Estate Dominance, The
Accommodation Doctrine, and Beyond: Why Texas is Ready to Take the Next Step with a
Surface Damage Act, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 461, 495 (2003).
30. Michelle Andrea Wenzel, Comment, The Model Surface Use and Mineral
Development Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 607, 629-30 (1993).
31. See Anschutz Corp. v. Sanders, 734 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Okla. 1987).
32. Sagebrush Res., LLC v. Peterson, 841 N.W.2d 705, 714 (N.D. 2014).
33. See Osage Nation ex rel. Osage Minerals Council v. Wind Capital Grp., No. 11–
CV–643–GKF–PJC, 2011 WL 6371384, at *8 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2011).

2018

SUSTAINABLE SURFACE MANAGEMENT

373

surface as a wind farm would diminish its rights of access. 34
The court declined to limit the surface owner’s proposed use
based on an anticipated, rather than actual, interference. 35
Although improvements to the surface may be later subjected to
destruction or removal by the mineral owner, the surface
owner’s right to develop its property is not restricted, even
where such development may require future accommodation by
the mineral owner or make its use more expensive.
Unsurprisingly, conflicts between the surface and mineral
owners of split estates are common. 36 Frequently, these
conflicts arise over disputes about the reasonableness of a
proposed surface use or requested accommodation. 37
Reasonableness is a fluid rather than static test. Whether an
activity is reasonable will be largely dependent on the individual
circumstances of the real property involved and the “usual,
customary and reasonable practices in the industry under like
circumstances of time, place and servient estate uses.”38 Thus,
whereas shooting a well with nitroglycerine to increase its flow
may have been considered common and good oil practice at one
time,39 it would likely be seen as reckless today. Likewise,
accommodation that required directional drilling from a corner
of a property might have been seen as a ludicrous suggestion at
one point, but has emerged as a commonly available and widely
accepted practice. 40
Reliance on the common-law implied easement is
problematic for both surface and mineral owners. At common
law, no compensation is owed to the surface owner for either the
right of access or damage resulting from uses that fall within the

34. Id. at *1-2.
35. Id. at *9-10.
36. Clarence A. Brimmer, The Rancher’s Subservient Surface Estate, 5 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 49, 52 (1970); David E. Pierce, Oil and Gas Easements, in 33 ENERGY &
MINERAL L. INST. 317, 318 (2012); James J. O’Malley & Kendor P. Jones, Chained Gates
and No Trespassing Signs: Dealing With Wary Landowners in a Brave New World, 51
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7-1, 7-4, 7-33 (2005).
37. Kramer, supra note 8, at 287.
38. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979).
39. Bradford Glycerine Co. v. Kizer, 113 F. 894, 895 (6th Cir. 1902) (describing the
practices of an “oil-well shooter”).
40. See Valence Operating Co. v. Tex. Genco, 255 S.W.3d 210, 217 (Tex. App.
2008).
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scope of the implied easement. 41 Additionally, in the absence of
negligence, the majority of courts—with the notable exception
of Louisiana—refuse to imply an obligation to restore the
premises into an oil and gas lease. 42
Although state
conservation agencies and federal land agencies may impose
remediation or orphan well bonding requirements as a condition
to obtaining a permit to drill, those requirements do not assure
the surface landowner that remediation will be to its
specifications or satisfaction. 43 The mineral owner’s rights
under the implied easement are likewise constrained. Uses that
exceed the scope of the implied easement for reasonably
necessary use constitute a trespass, and thus the mineral owners
uses are constantly measured against the evolving standard of
reasonableness.44 Further, the implied easement does not grant
the operator a license to commit a nuisance or to operate
negligently.45 Thus, surface owners may pursue claims for
41. EOG Res., Inc., v. Turner, 908 So. 2d 848, 854-55 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894, 897 (N.M. 1985); Moser v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (“It is reasonable to assume a grantor who
expressly conveys a mineral which may or must be removed by destroying a portion of the
surface estate anticipates his surface estate will be diminished when the mineral is
removed.”); Placid Oil Co. v. Lee, 243 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rainwater, 140 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940); Cosden Oil Co. v. Sides, 35 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 22, § 218.7, at 234 n.3; Kramer, supra note 8, at 340 (“The mineral
owner has a property interest and a contract right to use the surface without compensation
unless it engaged in unreasonable, excessive or negligent actions.”); see also Wyo. Outdoor
Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1245-47 (D. Wyo. 2005).
42. Amoco Prod. Co., 703 P.2d at 897; Nichols v. Burk Royalty Co., 576 P.2d 317,
323 (Okla. Civ. App. 1977); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363
(Tex. 1957); Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 30 (Tex. App. 2002); see also Robert L.
Theriot, Duty to Restore the Surface (Implied, Express, and Damages), in LA. MINERAL
LAW INST., FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL L AW 141, 148-49 (Patrick H.
Martin ed., 2008); Christopher S. Kulander, Surface Damages, Site-Remediation and Well
Bonding in Wyoming—Results and Analysis of Recent Regulations, 9 WYO. L. REV. 413,
434 (2009).
43. See 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1 (2017); 055-3 WYO. CODE R. § 4 (LexisNexis 2016).
44. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 22, § 218.8; Kramer, supra note 8, at 287-88.
45. Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., No. 4:10-cv-014, 2010 WL 11562067, at *5 (D.N.D.
Oct. 15, 2010) (denying summary judgment for a nuisance claim related to use of the
property for flaring, noise, and emissions); Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline v. Gardiner, 505
S.W.3d 580, 604-07 (Tex. 2016); Lucas Satterlee, Shattered Nerves: Addressing Induced
Seismicity Through the Law of Nuisance, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10326, 10331 (2016); M.
Kristeen Hand & Kyle R. Smith, Comment, The Deluge: Potential Solutions to Emerging
Conflicts Regarding On-Lease and Off-Lease Surface Damage Caused by Coal Bed
Methane Production, 1 WYO. L. REV. 661, 682-83 (2001).
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injunctive relief to “prevent or modify” ongoing operations and
thus operators may be subject to claims when even reasonable or
customary surface uses interfere with an owners’ use and
enjoyment of her property. 46 These limitations may result in
operational inefficiencies and ongoing conflicts between surface
and mineral owners.
As a result, a strong custom of contracting has developed
between surface and mineral owners. Surface and minerals
owners are likely to repeatedly encounter one another through
various stages of development and often on many parcels.
Initial seismic surveys for exploration yield exploratory drilling,
which result in operations, the potential of infill drilling and
increased density, and eventually abandonment and site
restoration. The result can be a relationship spanning hundreds
or thousands of acres and many decades of shared use of land.
To address the ongoing relationship, parties customarily meet to
outline plans and parameters for development. 47 These meetings
may result in “informal handshake agreements” or formal
contractual relationships that limit or expand permissible surface
uses, create obligations for restoration, impose operating
conditions, and require compensation for damages resulting
from reasonable surface uses. 48
II. STATUTORY INCENTIVES TO CONTRACT ON
PRIVATE AND FEDERAL LAND
The majority of states with oil and gas operations,
excepting California and Texas, have enacted statutes—often
called Split Estate Acts or Surface Damage Acts—that modify
the common law dominant-servient relationship and adjust
entitlements between mineral and surface owners.49 Split estate
46. Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 498 (Wyo. 1997); Matthew J. Salzman &
Aaron K. Friess, Shotguns, Locked Gates, and Indignation: Litigating Temporary
Restraining Orders and Injunctive Relief in Surface Use Disputes, in OIL & GAS
AGREEMENTS: S URFACE USE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 9-1, 9-1 to 9-3 (Rocky Mtn. Mineral
L. Found. 2017) [hereinafter OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS].
47. Kulander, supra note 42, at 416.
48. These provisions may be in leases, or often are contained with separate surface
owner agreements. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 22, §§ 673.3, 673.6.
49. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-72-214, -216 to -219 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 3460-127(1)(d) (2018); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/6(B) (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT.
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acts codify the custom of contracting between surface and
mineral owners by entitling surface owners to compensation for
damages and by imposing notice or negotiation requirements
and restricting surface access until an agreement, waiver, or
bond is in place. These acts have withstood constitutional
challenges even where the requirements are imposed
retroactively, and have been upheld as a valid exercise of the
states’ police power to protect public welfare. 50
All surface owner statutes require some method of notice to
the surface owner prior to drilling or commencement of drilling
or “oil and gas operations.” 51 Generally, operators must provide
surface owners with written notice that includes information
relative to the proposed operations—such as estimated timing
and the proposed drilling location. Kentucky and Illinois require
an actual meeting between the developer and surface owner if
the surface owner requests. 52 Statutes may also require that the
notice include an offer to negotiate for access and damages.
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and
Wyoming each require that parties carry out these negotiations
in good faith.53
Split estate acts in Colorado and Wyoming also modify the
common law implied easement by expressly requiring
accommodation of surface uses.54 Wyoming’s statute requires
that operators “reasonably accommodate existing surface
ANN. § 353.595 (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504 (West 2017); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 70-12-5 (West 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-420 to 113-425 (2018); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 38-18-07 (2018); O KLA. S TAT. tit. 52, § 318.2-.9 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED L AWS §
45-5A-4.1 (2018); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 60-1-604 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-21
(West 2018); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-3(a)(1) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-405 (2018).
50. Collins v. Oxley, 897 F.2d 456, 458-60 (10th Cir. 1990); Murphy v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 558-60 (8th Cir. 1984); Houck v. Hold Oil Corp., 867 P.2d 451,
457-58 (Okla. 1993); Jeanine Feriancek & Cynthia L. McNeill, Oil Company Surface Use:
Do Farmers Need Protection?, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 28, 29-30 (1995).
51. WYO. S TAT. ANN. § 30-5-402(b) (2018). States differ as to whether notice is
required for “non-surface disturbing activities” including inspections, staking,
measurements, and surveys. Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402(b), with N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 70-12-5, and S.D. CODIFIED L AWS § 45-5A-5.1 (2018); see also Kulander, supra
note 42, at 418.
52. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/4 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
353.595(3)(d).
53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.3; MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 45-5A-4.1; WYO. S TAT. ANN. § 30-5-402 (2018).
54. Paige Anderson, Reasonable Accommodation: Split Estates, Conservation
Easements, and Drilling in the Marcellus Shale, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 136, 148 (2013).
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uses.”55 Colorado’s act similarly requires an operator to
“conduct oil and gas operations in a manner that accommodates
the surface owner by minimizing intrusion upon and damage to
the surface of the land.”56 In the absence of a written agreement
for damages, the common-law accommodation doctrine may
still apply in states with split estate acts where the state
legislature has not expressly incorporated accommodation
requirements into the statute. 57
Like the common-law
accommodation doctrine in Texas, these declarations do not
upend the dominance of the mineral estate. These requirements
do not prohibit development where reasonable accommodations
are unavailable but rather require that an operator take
reasonable steps to minimize the damage and disruption caused
by its operations.
Perhaps most importantly, split estate acts create a statutory
right to compensation for surface damages resulting from lawful
mineral development operations. 58 Compensable harms differ
from state to state. While some include only improvements or
the values of agricultural uses, others permit recovery for
diminution in value or loss of access and use. 59 For example,
Kentucky and Illinois provide damages for “growing crops,
shrubs, trees, fences, roads, structures, improvements, personal
property, and livestock.”60 North Dakota, in addition to other
categories of damages, uniquely permits recovery for “lost use
55. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402; Jennifer A. C. Richardson, Protecting Surface
Land by Internalizing the Cost of Oil and Gas Development: Wyoming’s Surface Owner
Accommodation Act Strikes a More Sustainable Balance, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 697,
708-09 (2011).
56. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-127(1) (2018).
57. Mosser v. Denbury Res., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 906, 915-16 (D.N.D. 2015);
Sagebrush Res., LLC v. Peterson, 841 N.W.2d 705, 713-14 (N.D. 2014). New Mexico,
which had previously adopted the common law accommodation doctrine in Amoco
Production Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894, 897 (N.M. 1985), now imposes strict
liability for surface damages under its split estate act. See Woody Inv., LLC v. Sovereign
Eagle, LLC, 362 P.3d 107, 110 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
58. Vastar Res., Inc. v. Howard, 38 P.3d 236, 239 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001);
Christopher S. Kulander, Split-Estate and Site Remediation Issues on Tribal Lands, 2 TEX.
J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 125, 139 (2007) (“Surface Damage Acts are not substitutes for
standard civil actions brought on by tortious activities, such as negligent surface damage or
pollution”).
59. Susan Hlywa Topp, Severed Minerals: Are Surface Owners Entitled to Damages
for Diminution of Their Property Value?, 78 MICH. B.J. 148, 149-50 (1999).
60. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/6(A)(1) (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
353.595(5) (West 2018).

378

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:2

of and access to the surface owner’s land.” 61 This provision
formed the basis for a recent dispute regarding a surface owner’s
“lost use of and access to” the subsurface pore space under his
property resulting from the mineral developer’s produced water
disposal operations. 62 In addition to protecting losses to
improvements, Montana, Wyoming, South Dakota, New
Mexico, and North Dakota each include provisions granting
compensation for lost land value. 63 Despite identical language,
however, states define lost land value differently. For example,
in Montana, lost land value is limited to the “highest and best
reasonably available [non-mineral] use of the land” based on
uses that, if required, are already permitted. 64 Wyoming’s
statute provides no such limitation, thus potentially permitting
recovery for “any diminution in value” including, for example,
the dwindling of “dubious values associated with loss of a
remotely-possible future use.”65 Thus, while a surface owner
may not block exploration entirely or holdout for extortive
terms, it is provided with a cost-free guarantee that it will be
compensated for certain categories of losses resulting from
mineral development. As such, the surface owner can proceed
relatively unencumbered with development of its surface parcel
towards the highest and best use, notwithstanding future rights
of mineral entry.
Where parties cannot reach agreement on damages or
access prior to development, surface damage acts create
procedures for dispute resolution and assure operators
immediate access. Dispute resolution procedures may include
settlement offers, judicial resolution, mediation and arbitration. 66
In addition to protections provided by state statutes, in
Pennsylvania and West Virginia, separate coal bed methane
review boards exist to resolve surface use disputes related to

61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (2018).
62. Mosser v. Denbury Res., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 906, 922 (D.N.D. 2015).
63. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504(1)(a) (West 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.104; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-12-4(A) (West 2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-4 (2018);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-405(a)(i) (2018).
64. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-502(2) (West 2018).
65. Kulander, supra note 42, at 423, 427-28.
66. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-607 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-21 (West
2018); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-7 (2018); WYO. S TAT. ANN. § 30-5-406 (2018).
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well location and access issues.67 These dispute resolution
processes, however, cannot be used to forestall development.
Split estate acts universally include bonding mechanisms to
permit mineral owners or developers to proceed with
operations.68 Typically, the operator may post a bond amount
with the state conservation agency pending a final determination
of damages owed under the split estate statute. This serves the
dual purpose of permitting development to proceed without
unnecessary delay while assuring a timeline and process for
final resolution of damages. Despite this option, these bonding
mechanisms are rarely used. 69
Mineral and surface owners alike have a strong interest in
reaching a surface damage and use agreement. Surface damage
acts do not expand the rights of mineral owners to use the
surface and, accordingly, access provided by a bond is limited to
those reasonable uses that are within the scope of the commonlaw implied easement. Further, the bond is held by the
conservation agency and, thus, the surface owner has no access
to the funds until a final resolution is reached. The bond will
likely also only include coverage for those harms enumerated
within the statute. Accordingly, the strong mutual interest in
maintaining a relationship, avoiding tort liability, and
definitively resolving terms of access creates a strong incentive
to contract.
Importantly, split estate acts do not upend dominance of the
mineral estate. They do not, for example, provide the surface
owner with a veto or key holder right to unilaterally block
development. However, the importance of these statutes should
not be diminished. Split estate acts modify the traditional
property rule applied to split estates—guaranteeing the mineral
owner cost-free access to and enjoyment of his property—with
the addition of a liability rule requiring the mineral developer to
internalize some of the surface harms of development. In so
doing, these statutes reduce transactional costs related to
information-gathering and uncertainty, create a framework
67. Alyssa Looney, ADR and the Extraction of Coal Bed Methane from SplitOwnership Estates, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 371, 377 (2014).
68. Kulander, supra note 42, at 417.
69. Drake D. Hill & P. Jaye Rippley, The Split Estate: Communication and
Education Versus Legislation, 4 WYO. L. REV. 585, 599 (2004).
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within which bargaining can occur, and adjust the “power
balance between natural resource development companies and
surface owners.”70
A. Obligations to the Federal Split-Estate Surface Owner
The right of surface access on federal split estates is
generally express, rather than implied. Mineral reservations in
the Stock Raising Homestead Act, the Agricultural Entry Act,
and other land disposition laws expressly preserve the mineral
owners right “to reenter and occupy so much of the surface
thereof as may be required for all purposes reasonably incident
to the mining or removal of the coal or other minerals.” 70
Further, the reservation includes the right to dispose of the
minerals according to laws in place at the time of disposition. 71
Disposal may include leasing, unitization, communitization, or
other actions that impact the private surface. 72
Federal regulations impose additional requirements for
bonding and development of a surface plan of use.73 The extent
to which federal regulations control may depend on how the
minerals were reserved or the surface obtained and which
agency is responsible for management. 74 For example, for
surface lands acquired pursuant to the Weeks Act which overlie
private minerals, the extent that federal regulations can impose
additional conditions on development may be limited. 75
Operations on split estates within the National Wildlife Refuge
System or underlying lands managed by the National Park
Service may also be subject to additional operational
requirements.76

70

Alexandra B. Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 685
(2008).
70. 43 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2012).
71. Id.
72. 30 U.S.C. § 226(m) (2012 & Supp. 2015); Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches,
LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2014); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith, 471
F.2d 594, 596 (10th Cir. 1973).
73. See 30 C.F.R. § 942.800 (2017).
74. Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 253 (3d Cir. 2011).
75. Id. at 252; Clayton Gritz, Drilling for Split Estate Clarity: The Impact of Minard
Run Oil Company v. United States Forest Service, 24 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 287, 307 (2013).
76. Mergen, supra note 4, at 430-32.
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The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S.
Forest Service (USFS) manage the majority of split estate lands
in the United States. In addition to authority pursuant to the
Property and Supremacy Clauses, the Mineral Leasing Act
directs agencies to dispose of reserved minerals “to promote the
orderly development of the oil and gas deposits in the publicly
owned lands of the United States through private enterprise.” 77
However, regulatory considerations are not limited to the
maximization of production or revenue from public lands. Other
federal laws, including the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) and the Energy Policy Act of 1992
(EPACT) include provisions requiring the consideration of
surface uses and environmental impacts, even where wells are
directionally drilled into federal minerals from entirely on nonfederal surface locations. 78 Both the BLM and Forest Services
are multiple use agencies and thus have authority to establish
reasonable conditions to protect federal surface resources and to
take actions necessary to prevent undue degradation to federal
lands.79 These standards have resulted in an approach to surface
management which permits access to federal minerals on split
estates such that both parties can use and enjoy their property
“to the highest degree possible not inconsistent with the rights of
the other.”80 Consistent with this federal purpose, a number of
regulations impose additional conditions on surface use that
resemble the due regard standard encapsulated by the commonlaw accommodation doctrine. 81

77. Harvey v. Udall, 384 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1967) (quoting S. SUBCOMM. OF
AFFAIRS, 84TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF OIL &

THE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR
GAS LEASE PRACTICES 2 (1957)).

78. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012) (stating that the
Secretary of Agriculture has authority under the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing
Reform Act of 1987 to regulate surface disturbing activities); Mergen, supra note 4, at 44344; Richardson, supra note 55, at 713; BUREAU OF L AND MANAGEMENT, Permanent
Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-014, Directional Drilling Into Federal Mineral Estate
from Well Pads on Non-Federal Locations, (June 12, 2018).
79. The operating regulations in 43 C.F.R § 3164.1 authorize the BLM’s Director to
issue Onshore Oil and Gas Orders when necessary to implement and supplement the
operating regulations. 43 C.F.R § 3164.1(a) (2017); Robert B. Keiter, Ecological
Concepts, Legal Standards, and Public Land Law: An Analysis and Assessment, 44 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 943, 956 (2004).
80. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976).
81. Laitos & Getches, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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The best practices for management of federally-owned
mineral rights on private lands are comprehensively outlined in
the BLM’s and USFS’s “Gold Book.” 82 BLM regulations
require a Surface Use Plan of Operations and a Reclamation
Plan to be filed with the application for permit to drill. 83 The
Surface Use Plan of Operations may control items such as use of
existing roads, locations of wells and facilities, and waste
disposal.84 Although such action is not required, mineral owners
are highly encouraged to incorporate environmental Best
Management Practices into the Surface Use Plan of
Operations.85 Onshore Order 1 also prohibits certain surfacedamaging activities such as operations on steep slopes, in
floodplains or wetlands, during periods of freezing or thawing,
or which may otherwise contribute to erosion. 86
In addition to these requirements, BLM regulations also
address surface use on split estates. 87 Like many state split
estate acts, BLM regulations require that the mineral developer
notify the surface owner prior to entry or staking. 88 Mineral
developers must engage in good-faith efforts to reach an
agreement for damages, access, and use with the surface owner.
The surface owner is also entitled to compensation for loss or
82. See generally BUREAU OF L AND MGMT. & U.S. FOREST SERVICE, S URFACE
OPERATING S TANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND
DEVELOPMENT: THE GOLD BOOK (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter T HE GOLD BOOK], https://
www. blm.gov/ programs/ energy- and- minerals/ oil- and- gas/ operations-andproduction/the-gold-book [https://perma.cc/HWH9-37AC].
83. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(d) (2017); Onshore Oil & Gas Order No. 1, Approval of
Operations, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,308, 10,329, 10,331 (Mar. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Onshore
Order 1].
84. Onshore Order 1, supra note 83, at 10,331.
85. Id. at 10,330.
86. Id. at 10,335.
87. Id. at 10,330. There is some dispute about whether these rules preempt state split
estate laws or whether both apply. Richardson, supra note 55, at 699. Wyoming, for
example, requires compliance with its split estate act on Federal Lands. Id. The BLM has
stated that it believes Wyoming’s statute is limited to private and state lands but has not
challenged Wyoming’s application of its statute to federal lands in addition to requirements
of federal regulations. Id. In the event agreement cannot be reached with the surface
owner, dual bonding with both the BLM and the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
may be required. Id. at 712; see Matt Micheli, Showdown at the OK Corral – Wyoming’s
Challenge to U.S. Supremacy on Federal Split Estate Lands, 6 WYO. L. REV. 31, 32
(2006).
88. Onshore Order 1, supra note 83, at 10,336; THE GOLD BOOK, supra note 82, at
8-9.
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damages to crops or tangible improvements, the scope of which
may be limited based on the terms of the land disposition act
under which the land was patented. 89 Other damages are only
reimbursable if the use is excessive or negligent, exceeding the
scope of reasonably necessary activities expressly provided for
in the reservation.90 If the parties are unable to reach a surface
access and damages agreement, the mineral developer may
obtain access to the premises by posting a Surface Owner
Damages Bond, but cannot exceed those uses that are reasonably
necessary as expressly provided for within the mineral
reservation.91 The surface owner has procedural rights during
the bonding process to object to the sufficiency of the bond but
is otherwise limited in its ability to control access or timing of
operations.92 Accordingly, both surface and mineral owners
typically prefer to obtain surface damage agreements rather than
proceed with the bonding process.93
III. THE SURFACE USE AGREEMENT
Oil and gas development often entails surface disturbances
that damage the land and interfere with the use and enjoyment of
surface property. Where the property is owned in fee, the
mineral owner has considerable bargaining power to obtain
restrictions on surface use, contract for surface and
environmental protections, and negotiate payments for
damages.94 Accordingly, when leasing their minerals, fee
owners customarily impose conditions on surface use as part of
the oil and gas lease or as a concurrently executed surface use
agreement.95 These agreements may include restrictions on well
89. THE GOLD BOOK, supra note 82, at 12.
90. See Bell v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 85 N.W.2d 246, 251 (N.D. 1957).
91. 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1(c) (2017). Procedures may differ where the surface is
classified as restricted Indian Lands. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3164.3, 3164.4 (2017); U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Instruction Memorandum No. 2003-131 (Apr. 2,
2003); Hill & Rippley, supra note 69, at 599.
92. See 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1(d) (2017).
93. See SE. WYO. MINERAL DEV. COAL., LANDOWNER GUIDELINES FOR
NEGOTIATING A MINERAL LEASE OR SURFACE USE AGREEMENT 20, 26 (2011), http://
region8water.colostate.edu/PDFs/Oilgaslandownerguidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/T29UZT6G].
94. Kendor P. Jones et al., Split Estates and Surface Access Issues, in LANDMAN’S
LEGAL H ANDBOOK 181, 183-85 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 5th ed. 2013).
95. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 22, at §§ 673.3-.6.
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locations, restrictions on use of the surface owner’s water,
setbacks from specified structures or features, express
obligations to restore the condition of the premises, and general
agreements for non-interference.96 Damage provisions often
provide for the types of damages that the surface owner can
recover, methods to determine the extent of damages suffered,
and remedies available to the landowner for breach of surface
use provisions.97
Even in states with surface damage acts, split estate owners
have considerably less bargaining power than fee owners
principally because a split estate owner cannot withhold access
to the minerals based on acceptance of conditions for surface
use.98 Nonetheless, the majority of split-estate surface owners
and mineral developers contract for conditions of access and use
and compensation for damages.99 These agreements, variously
called Surface Compensation or Surface Damage Agreements
are not a purchase of access rights: the mineral owner already
has a legal right of access. Rather, these agreements address the
reasonable access, operational, and remediation concerns of the
surface owner and provide the mineral developer with liability
releases, conflict-free access to the surface, and limit the
transaction costs and risk associated with using litigation or
arbitration to define the extent of their rights and obligations. 100
Public governance mechanisms such as the Clean Air Act,
Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act, address many of
the macro-scale externalities of development.
These

96. See generally id.
97. See generally id. § 673.6 (explaining different damage provisions).
98. See infra Part II.
99. See Robert J. Duffy, Political Mobilization, Venue Change, and the Coal Bed
Methane Conflict in Montana and Wyoming, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 409, 419 (2005);
LoValerie Mullins, The Equity Illusion of Surface Ownership in Coalbed Methane Gas;
The Rise of Mutual Simultaneous Rights in Mineral Law and the Resulting Need for
Dispute Resolution in Split Estate Relations, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 191
(2009).
100. These transactional costs are not insignificant and may significantly affect lease
bonus payments on split estate lands. See Timothy Fitzgerald, Evaluating Split Estates in
Oil and Gas Leasing, 86 LAND ECON. 294, 307-08 (2010); James L. Huffman, The
Allocative Impact of Mineral Severance: Implications for the Regulation of Surface
Mining, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 201, 216-22 (illustrating transactional costs through
examples).
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regulations, however, are “piecemeal and reactive.” 101 As such,
they may be less equipped to address site-specific concerns and
localize impacts of development. 102
Like impact benefit
agreements, good neighbor agreements, and environmental
agreements, surface damage agreements provide a supraregulatory mechanism to address environmental impacts to the
individual property. 103 Additionally, by providing a proactive,
relational approach rather than a compliance-based approach,
these agreements present an opportunity for private parties to
contract for operations with a restorative, rather than harmavoidant, effect. 104
Surface damage agreements are as varied as the land on
which oil and gas development occurs. Just as there is no onesize-fits-all oil and gas lease, there is no universal surface
damage agreement. Further, surface damage agreements are
rarely publicly recorded in full. Instead, parties customarily
record a memorandum of surface use agreement that provides
public notice of the agreement without making the terms
public.105 Accordingly, an empirical study of surface use
provisions is not possible, although several sources provide
sample agreements or descriptions of commonly included
terms.106
101. See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser et al., Using Proactive Legal Strategies for
Corporate Environmental Sustainability, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 3 (2016).
102. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy
of Energy Production, U. PA. L. REV. 431, 480-83 (2013) (demonstrating local
governments have difficulties addressing impacts of development).
103. See Berger-Walliser et al., supra note 102, at 14-17 (describing agreements
outside of legal system that address different issues); Don C. Smith & Jessica Richards,
Social License to Operate: Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges Facing the Oil &
Gas Industry, in 1 SPECIAL INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL MINING AND OIL & GAS L AW,
DEVELOPMENT, AND INVESTMENT 15-1, 15-31 (Rocky Mtn. Mineral L. Inst. 2015); Sarah
M. Zuzulock & James R. Kuipers, The Good Neighbor Agreement: A Proactive Approach
to Water Management through Community Enforcement of Site-Specific Standards, 53
GREENER MGMT. INT’L 73, 75 (2006); see generally Lindsay Galbraith et al., Towards a
New Supraregulatory Approach to Environmental Assessment in Northern Canada, 25
IMPACT ASSESSMENT & PROJECT APPRAISAL 27 (2007).
104. See Berger-Walliser et al., supra note 102, at 9-13 (explaining proactive
approaches and the benefits).
105. Jones, supra note 94, at 193-95.
106. See id.; Randall B. Reed & Lindsay A. Woznick, Addressing Key Items in
Surface Use Agreements, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS, supra note 46, at 8-1, 8-8 to 8-23;
see generally Harper Estes & Douglas Prieto, Contracts as Fences: Representing the
Agricultural Producer in an Oil and Gas Environment, 73 TEX. B.J. 378 (2010) (describing
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Compensation is the most heavily negotiated and important
component of these agreements to most surface landowners and
has the largest impact on surface owner perception of oil and gas
activities.107 Compensation can take the form of a per-acre
payment for disturbed land, a gross payment for all damages, a
small amount of royalty, a well payment, or an annual payment
structured more like a lease. 108 The majority of agreements also
include provisions for determination of anticipated damages to
land—for example, for damages caused by spills or resulting
from injury to livestock or per-rod payments for roads,
powerlines, and pipelines.109
Surface users and mineral owners tailor agreements to suit
the anticipated use by the mineral owner, the existing and
planned uses of the surface owner, the unique topographical and
ecological conditions of the surface parcel, and the priorities of
the surface owner. For example, provisions of a surface damage
agreement for undeveloped rangeland may differ substantially
than those for development where there are residential uses or
row crops.110 While some of these provisions may mimic
requirements in regulations, often parties contract for greater
surface protections than would otherwise be required by law.
Broadly, surface use terms can be categorized into three
general clauses in mineral leases); Jeffrey R. Fiske, Surface Damage Agreements, in LAND
& PERMITTING II 3-1 (Rocky Mtn. Mineral L. Found. 1996) (pointing out damage clauses
in surface agreements); Joseph B.C. Fitzsimons & F. Parks Brown, Surface Use
Negotiations from the Landowner’s Perspective, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS, supra note
46, at 11D-1 (stating there are surface agreements used in general practice); Christopher G.
Hayes, Surface Use Agreements, in SEVERED MINERALS, supra note 23, at 15-1; Rebecca
Love Kourlis & Stephen D. Alfers, Surface Use Agreements, in RIGHTS OF ACCESS AND
SURFACE USE 2-1 (Rocky Mtn. Mineral L. Found. 1984) (providing checklist for surface
use agreements). While some of the provisions and descriptions of terms referenced herein
are included within published cases, many are based on agreements provided to the author
by surface users and landowners.
107. See generally POWDER R IVER BASIN RES. COUNCIL, THE S TATE OF T HE SPLIT
ESTATE: A L ANDOWNER PERSPECTIVE : F IVE YEARS AFTER P ASSAGE OF THE WYOMING
SPLIT
ESTATE
S TATUTE
(2010),
https://www.powderriverbasin.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/state-of-split-estate-prbrc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK44-4PYE]
(explaining compensation is the most important concern); Alan R. Collins & Kofi
Nkansah, Divided Rights, Expanded Conflict: Split Estate Impacts on Surface Owner
Perceptions of Shale Gas Drilling, 91 LAND ECON. 688 (2015).
108. Reed & Woznick, supra note 106, at 8-12 to 8-15.
109. See id.
110. See Estes & Prieto, supra note 106, at 380-85 (illustrating agreements differ
based on the type of land and providing examples of certain provisions).
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categories: negative restrictions on operations, affirmative
requirements, and forward-looking or proactive clauses.111
Restrictive provisions are provisions that limit the extent of
surface use permitted by the operator. 112 These provisions
frequently include seasonal restrictions on operations based on
planting, harvesting, or hunting seasons, or periods of freeze and
thaw. State conservation rules will typically include setbacks
from lease lines and other wells, and may include setbacks from
occupied structures. Through the surface damage agreement,
surface owners frequently negotiate for greater distances from
significant locations such as a home, livestock pond, a calving
barn, irrigation systems, archeological or paleontological sites,
slopes of a specified grade, or specific landscape features. 113
Restrictive provisions may also limit methods for produced
water disposal—for example, requiring underground injection in
lieu of surface evaporation—or create total surface disturbance
maximums.
Restrictive provisions frequently require the
mineral developer to keep the property free of rubbish and may
also impose limits on company employees and invitees such as
prohibitions on dogs, hunting, fishing, and the use of drugs,
alcohol or firearms. 114 Landowners may also require mineral
developers to limit activities to designated industrial areas or to
consent to areas of no surface occupancy. Landowners may also
require operators to waive rights to condemnation—for example,
for pipelines or ways of necessary—or to bond on.
Affirmative requirements are those provisions that require
the mineral developer to take additional actions to protect,
restore, or improve the surface, provide benefits to the
landowners, or to avoid interference with the surface owner’s
use and enjoyment of the property.115 Affirmative provisions
frequently include practical considerations to avoid damage or
interference to the landowner’s property or operations such as
the installation of cattle guards and gates, construction of berms
111. Jones, supra note 94, at 193-95.
112. See Reed & Woznick, supra note 106, at 8-15 to 8-19 (examining restrictive
provisions in surface use agreements and the limitations imposed).
113. See Lionheart Co. v. PGS Onshore, Inc., No. 10-06-00303-CV, 2007 WL
1704906, at *2 (Tex. App. June 13, 2007) (explaining landowners had contracted for a
non-drilling zone on the property).
114. Estes & Prieto, supra note 106, at 382-85; Jones, supra note 94, at 193-95.
115. See Fitzsimons & Brown, supra note 106, at 11D-17 to 11D-18.
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to protect streams and wetlands, noxious weed control, and
noise and visual impact mitigation. In addition to limiting harm,
landowners may also contract for improvements to the property,
including the installation or improvement of roads or fences,
development of water resources, or development of habitat
improvements to generate tradable mitigation credits. 116
Landowners may also contract for a higher standard of care than
is otherwise required by law, including hazardous waste
handling provisions, obligations to abandon and reclaim wells to
the landowners’ specifications, and the use of specified seed
mixes.117
Provisions may also provide landowners with
economic benefits such as rights of first refusal to sell the
developer water or gravel, or payment by the developer to
perform reclamation activities.
Lastly, surface damage agreements frequently include
proactive or forward-looking provisions that focus on dispute
preemption and address the ongoing relationship between the
surface and mineral owner. 118 It is through these provisions that
landowners can establish frameworks for communication and
accountability. Communication can be facilitated through
provisions requiring additional notice prior to commencing
operations, coordination of future surface development, or
which establish a plan of operations for future drilling. The use
of consultants to develop, implement, or monitor various
components of surface use may create mechanisms for
accountability. Parties may also impose information governance
provisions such as environmental reporting and monitoring and
the incorporation of early warning mechanisms. For example, in
areas of coal bed methane development or shallow hydraulic
fracturing landowners may contract for proactive groundwater
monitoring to assure non-interference with the landowners’
water and wells.

116. Id. at 11D-17.
117. Estes & Prieto, supra note 106, at 384.
118. Berger-Walliser et al., supra note 101, at 10-11 (describing proactive law “as an
enabling instrument to create success and foster sustainable relationships”).
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IV. THE GOVERNANCE FUNCTION OF SURFACE USE
AGREEMENTS
Surface damage agreements advance environmental
protections and sustainability goals for oil and gas development
on private surface lands. The agreements are highly adaptable
and are customized by landowners and mineral developers to
suit the unique conditions of the land and priorities of the
surface users. As a result, the surface use agreement can be an
effective mechanism for context-based development and to
control for micro-level externalities. By requiring energy
developers to negotiate with split-estate surface owners, split
estate acts shift power to demand environmental exactions to
those parties who are most likely to experience the localized
impacts of development without sharing in economic benefits. 119
However, surface damage agreements are a supplement to,
not a substitute for, public governance structures. While
violations of environmental laws may also breach contractual
obligations in surface damage agreements, private remedies and
enforcement do not supplant regulation. 120
Overall, the
existence of split estates or surface damage agreements have not
been shown to result in fewer violations of environmental
laws.121 This suggests that, while surface use agreements may
result in site-specific sustainability practices to minimize
impacts to surface owners, they may not be an effective
mechanism to increase public environmental regulatory
compliance. Instead, the surface damage agreement should be
used as part of a hybrid approach to complement public

119. Although damage calculations may include losses to tenants, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 38-11.1-08.1 (2018), the majority of split estate acts however do not require negotiation
with other parties who may have surface use rights in the property, including tenants such
as wind developers or agricultural lessees, although parties are well advised to include
surface tenants as parties to agreements. See Reed & Woznick, supra note 107, at 8-9.
120. Peter A. Appel, Improving Corporate Environmental Performance:
Encouraging Sustainable Commerce Through Regulatory and Other Governmental Action
9-10 (Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 201127, 2011), https:// papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm? abstract_id=1924808
[https://perma.cc/78L5-M9RH].
121. Timothy Fitzgerald, The Role of Ownership in Environmental Performance:
Evidence from Coalbed Methane Development, 52 ENVTL. MGMT. 1503, 1514 (2013)
(measuring violations of WYPDES permits, noting that land ownership patterns may
impact violations due to more unified private land along waterways).
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governance and “fill gaps” with the localized expertise and
concerns of landowners. 122
The localized and individualized nature of surface damage
agreements also limit their utility as an environmental
governance mechanism.
Surface owners negotiate these
agreements for their individual benefit and not for broad societal
benefits such as clean air, clean water, species protection, or
limiting greenhouse gas emissions from exploration and
production activities. 123 Thus, the extent to which owners
negotiate for additional environmental protections or
sustainability practices will be based on the individualized
concerns, values, and priorities of the surface landowner as well
as the landowner’s willingness to exchange monetary
consideration for these “soft benefits.” The level of protection
negotiated by a landowner may also be driven based on their
bargaining power and sophistication. These dynamics may be
determined by factors including whether the surface owner also
owns the minerals, the size of the property, “the geographic
location of the property, the geologic location of the property,
the specific company seeking to lease the property, and, of
course, prevailing economic conditions.”124 Accordingly, split
estate acts bring the parties to the table and necessitate the
negotiation process, but do not assure an environmentallypreferable outcome or balance between local, regional, and
national environmental considerations.
Not all local landowners have the right to participate in
surface damage negotiations. The right to damages and the
power to exact concessions from developers is based on
ownership, not on the extent to which a party may experience
harm from development. For example, split estate acts only
require negotiation with the owner of the surface land on which
the well is drilled. 125 As a result, surface negotiations may be
122. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 129, 186 (2013); see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548 (2000); see generally Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman,
Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
123. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 22, § 673.3 (“Restrictions of this kind are for
the benefit of the owner of the protected premises, structures or trees and hence may not be
enforced by owners of other interests in the premises.”).
124. Estes & Prieto, supra note 106, at 380.
125. See Micheli, supra note 89, at 33-34.
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required with a landowner living out of state or with thousands
of acres between their home and the well but impose no similar
obligation to contract with a party across a property line but only
five hundred feet from that same well. These parties may have
vastly different concerns related to drilling. The neighboring
owner is likely to directly experience environmental impacts of
drilling and thus might attribute more value to provisions which
assure environmental compliance and control for noise, air
pollution, and aesthetic impacts. In contrast, an out-of-state
owner’s self-interest may drive him to negotiate for monetary
consideration and higher reclamation standards to prevent
degradation of land value.
The protections provided by surface damage agreements
are also limited by the mechanisms of enforcement.126 These
are private contracts between private parties. The community
and the public are incidental, rather than intended, third-party
beneficiaries to these contracts and have no rights of
enforcement. Further, since surface damage agreements are
rarely recorded,127 there is a lack of transparency associated with
the governance they provide. For example, state and federal
inspectors charged with releasing well plugging or remediation
bonds may be unaware of additional remediation standards the
surface damage agreement requires. Even were those terms
public, an inspector would not have authority to withhold release
of the bonds based on a perceived violation of those private
contracts.
Dynamics between surface and mineral owners may drive
dispute resolution towards mechanisms that repair the
relationship and settle damages rather than obtain performance.
Disputes relative to surface damage agreements may be resolved
through further negotiation, alternative dispute resolution such
as mediation or arbitration, or through litigation for an
injunction, damages, or specific performance. 128 These disputes
frequently result after a drawn out period of failures on both
126. Shannon L. Ferrell, The Oklahoma Surface Damage Act: Basics for the ‘NonOil-and-Gas’ Practitioner, 80 OKLA. B.J. 1049, 1050-51 (2009).
127. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
128. Jamie L. Jost & Ronald I. Schindler, Surface Use Agreements: The Good, The
Bad, and the Ugly, in SURFACE USE FOR MINERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW WEST 12-1
(Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found., Feb. 2008).
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sides resulting in animosity and distrust between the parties. 129
Litigation and recurrent disputes are likely to be undesirable to
both parties. Although surface owners have an interest in
enforcing the private contractual provisions within surface
damage agreements, where language is vague or key portions of
the arrangement were not written down, industry custom and
usage may point towards interpretation that is unfavorable to the
landowner.130 Disputes also erode value and result in costly
delays to the mineral developer. Accordingly, while both parties
should be aware of their rights and remedies, rebuilding the
good-neighbor relationship and resolving past damages in a
manner that builds understanding are most likely the key
priorities of both parties. Successful dispute resolution will also
help avoid recurrent disputes by enhancing collaboration to
ensure future satisfactory performance.
V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRIVATE GOVERNANCE IN
UPSTREAM SURFACE MANAGEMENT
Surface damage agreements present an opportunity for
innovation and experimentation through the incorporation of
“prescriptive” “performance-based or technology-based
standards,” “market leveraging,” and “informational”
governance instruments. 131 Through these instruments it may be
possible to inform and empower landowners to negotiate for
environmental standards, develop and promote best practices,
and increase transparency and accountability of best practice
implementation.
Landowner advocacy groups play an important role in
reducing information costs and discrepancies in bargaining
position among surface owners. Information regarding surface
use agreements and terms may be challenging to obtain, and
smaller landowners or those less experienced in the negotiation
of surface damage agreements may not be aware of existing best
practices. Through education initiatives, development of best
practices or contract templates, and negotiation of regional
129. Id.
130. Ernest E. Smith, The Growing Demand for Oil and Gas and the Potential
Impact Upon Rural Land, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 8 (2008).
131. Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental
Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 23-24 (2015).
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good-neighbor agreements,132 landowner advocacy groups can
resolve some of the asymmetries, thus resulting in regional
consistency. Already, groups such as the Powder River Basin
Resource Council, the West Virginia Surface Owners’ Rights
Organization, and the Center for the American West have
developed materials to provide information to landowners
including checklists, negotiation guides, and sample
agreements.133
These resources may result in increased
collaboration between landowners and neighbors in surface-useagreement negotiation. 134 These efforts have resulted in an
unlikely alliance between green advocacy, tribes, and western
ranchers with a common goal of conservation. 135
The implementation of prescriptive performance and
technology-based standards within surface damage agreements
may reduce information and transaction costs and provide
verifiable performance metrics. These collective standardsetting instruments and certification or labeling programs are
increasingly used in other contexts. For example, companies
can obtain certification based on third-party verification of
standards for agricultural products such as food, fish, or wood
products, green building practices, and the design, construction,
132. See, e.g., Good Neighbor Agreement, N. PLAINS RESOURCE COUNCIL, https://
northernplains.org/issues/good-neighbor-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/TWR9-NJVT].
133. See generally, e.g., DAVID B. MCMAHON ET AL., WEST VIRGINIA S URFACE
OWNERS’ GUIDE TO O IL AND GAS (2d ed. 2005), https://wvsoro.org/west-virginia-surfaceowners-guide-oil-gas-pdf [https://perma.cc/2RVC-9BGP]; Patty Limerick et al., What
Every Westerner Should Know About Oil Shale, CTR. FOR AM. W., https://
www.centerwest.org/ projects/ energy/ oil- shale/ oil- shaleabout- this-guide
[https://perma.cc/SXN6-22VL]; POWDER RIVER BASIN RES. COUNCIL, A LANDOWNER
GUIDE TO THE WYOMING SPLIT ESTATE S TATUTE (2005) [hereinafter LANDOWNER
GUIDE], https:// www.powderriverbasin.org/ wp-content/ uploads/ 2017/ 12/ splitestateprbrc.pdf [https://perma.cc/93AN-P62X]; Resources for Land Owners, POWDER
RIVER BASIN RESOURCE COUNCIL [hereinafter Resources], https:// www.
powderriverbasin.org/ resources- for- landowners/ [https://perma.cc/6BGR-AWKK].
134. For example, the Powder River Basin Resource Council encourages landowners
to communicate and collectively negotiate for surface protections. See Resources, supra
note 133 (“It is in your best interest to keep in contact with your neighbors. You may be
better positioned for negotiation if you know what your neighbors are doing or better yet,
get organized as a group, then negotiate as a group[.]”).
135. Keith G. Bauerle, Reaping the Whirlwind: Federal Oil and Gas Development
on Private Lands in the Rocky Mountain West, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1083, 1088, 1091
(2006) (“Whereas in the context of the split estate working landscapes in the Powder River
Basin, the progressive rancher/green alliance is trying to protect these lands not by keeping
development out but rather by trying to insurance that it is accomplished in a responsible
manner that protects the environmental and cultural heritage for future generations.”).
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and operation of civil infrastructure projects.136 The electronics
industry, through the Responsible Business Alliance, has
developed a code of conduct including a set of standards relative
to sustainability, conflict minerals, and human rights. 137 Similar
opportunities exist within the oil and gas and renewable energy
development context. 138 Independent groups such as the
American Petroleum Institute, the Center for Sustainable Shale
Development and the Gas and Preservation Partnership have
developed best practices to address some of the environmental
and health harms associated with energy development. 139
However, presently, there are no third-party certifications for
sustainable surface impact management.
Landowners may reference external standards or
incorporate market-leveraging mechanisms within surface
damage agreements.140 For example, one landowner described
agreements requiring maintenance of functional acreage as
described by the Wyoming Conservation Exchange’s Greater
Sage-Grouse Habitat Quantification Tool, 141 adopting protective
stipulations within Wyoming’s Greater Sage-Grouse Core Areas
Protection Strategy, 142 and requiring reclamation and restoration
to conform to the voluntary standards set forth within
Wyoming’s compensatory mitigation framework. 143 Like other
136. Vandenbergh, supra note 122, at 148-54; see, INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE
INFRASTRUCTURE, http://sustainableinfrastructure.org/envision/ (last visited June 12,
2018).
137. RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS ALLIANCE, Code of Conduct (Jan. 1. 2018), http://
www.responsiblebusiness.org/standards/code-of-conduct/ (last visited June 15, 2018).
138. Although this article focuses on oil and gas, similar opportunities for
incorporation of external standards exist for surface intensive renewable energy
developments, such as for solar or wind.
139. Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, Federalism, and Private Governance, 39 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 107, 109 (2015).
140. Light & Orts, supra note 132, at 32.il
141. MATT HOLLORAN ET AL., WYO. CONSERVATION EXCH., GREATER S AGEGROUSE HABITAT Q UANTIFICATION TOOL: A MULTI-SCALED APPROACH FOR ASSESSING
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS TO GREATER S AGE-GROUSE H ABITAT 6-7 (2015), http://
www.wyomingconservationexchange.org/
wp-content/
uploads/
2014/
08/
WY_Sage_Grouse_HQT_May01_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/J39J-X5KJ].
142. See Exec. Order No. 2015-4, 244 Wyo. Gov’t Reg. 1, 1-4, 10-12 (LexisNexis
Aug. 2015).
143. STATE OF WYO., REVISED GREATER S AGE-GROUSE – COMPENSATORY
MITIGATION FRAMEWORK 6-9 (2017), https:// wgfd.wyo.gov/ WGFD/ media/ content/
Habitat/ 20170 710-Revised-Habitat-Mitigation-Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/A86U9GPF]; Kevin E. Doherty et al., Energy Development and Conservation Tradeoffs:
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assurance or certification programs, Wyoming’s sage-grouse
mitigation framework includes measurement of achievable
goals, accountability metrics, and impact assessments.144
According to a study by the Western Energy Alliance, oil and
gas developers frequently make agreements to maintain
functional acreage in exchange for financial incentives:
The majority of documents contain adaptive management
and monitoring; no surface occupancy buffers; seasonal, timing,
and spatial restrictions; interim and final reclamation; traffic
reduction and restrictions; and noise abatement. In addition,
companies utilize measures that permanently reduce footprint in
GrSG habitats including horizontal drilling, reuse of produced
water, multiple-wells on drill pads, co-location of facility
equipment and twinning pipelines, and funding for GrSG
research projects. 145
Credits generated through the compensatory mitigation
program could have value to both the producers, who might be
required to purchase credits to offset operations in core areas,
and to landowners, who could sell those credits to other users.
Similarly, landowners may contract for information
gathering, monitoring or accountability through provisions
requiring the use of third-party consultants or disclosure of
information through public portals. For example, the Wyoming
Conservation Exchange requires appointment of a third-party
verifier to determine baseline project conditions and monitor
ongoing maintenance. 146 Similarly, even prior to adoption of
Systematic Planning for Greater Sage Grouse in their Eastern Ranges, in GREATER S AGEGROUSE: ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF A L ANDSCAPE SPECIES AND ITS H ABITATS
505, 513-16 (Steven T. Knick & John W. Connelly eds., 2011).
144. Restoration credits are awarded “when a disturbed site conforms to the
appropriate Ecological Site Description (ESD) after five (5) years of data collection with a
documented stable state and trend toward optimal GSG habitat.” STATE OF WYO., supra
note 142, at 6.
145. Greater Sage-Grouse Conservation Study, W. ENERGY ALLIANCE, https://
www. westernenergyalliance.org/ knowledge- center/ wildlife/ greater- sage-grouse/
greater- sage- grouse- conservation- study [https://perma.cc/VN63-PA9T]; see generally
SWCA ENVTL. CONSULTANTS, EVALUATION OF THE NEPA PROCESS AS AN ADEQUATE
REGULATORY MECHANISM TO E LIMINATE OR MINIMIZE T HREATS TO GREATER S AGEGROUSE ASSOCIATED WITH O IL AND N ATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES (2014)
(full study).
146. WYO. CONSERVATION EXCH., EXCHANGE MANUAL 29-32, 48-50, 56 (2014),
http://www.wyomingconservationexchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/WyomingConservation-Exchange-Manual-v-1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNN2-QTKF].
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Wyoming’s chemical disclosure and groundwater monitoring
requirements, 147 landowners reported contracting for third-party
groundwater testing and enhanced environmental reporting
through mechanisms such as FracFocus. Incorporation of these
voluntary standards indicates a broader opportunity for use of
external metrics within surface damage agreements.
Collectively, surface damage agreements can result in the
emergence of best practices that shape understanding of what
uses and accommodations are reasonable. Recall, first, that a
mineral owner has the implied right to use so much of the
surface as is reasonably necessary to the development of the
minerals and, second, that the accommodation doctrine may
require a mineral developer to accommodate, to the extent
reasonably possible, the existing uses of the surface owner. 148
These determinations of reasonableness evolve over time based
on an assessment of custom and practice in the industry.
Surface use agreements are a powerful mechanism to shape
custom and practice towards more sustainable surface
management, water handling, restoration, and production
practices. As demands for environmental protections such as
smaller land disturbances, stream protection, or habitat
improvement become commonplace, these standards may
evolve judicial understandings of reasonableness within a
specific region. While these benchmarks do not replace the
need for environmental regulation, they may overall encourage
new norms of sustainable surface management practices. 149
Incorporation of private governance mechanisms within
surface damage agreements may also provide opportunities for
companies to receive recognition for good surface management
practices and to build social license. Social license refers to a
company’s perceived legitimacy and implied rights to operate
based on perceived conformance with legal and social norms

147. See 55-3 WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis 2018); Hannah J. Wiseman, The
Private Role in Public Fracturing Disclosure and Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. ONLINE 49, 53-54, 54 n.40 (2013).
148. See supra notes 8-46 and accompanying text.
149. But see Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law as Product and
Byproduct, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 521, 525, 527 (2013).
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imposed by society. 150 Lack of transparency and community
engagement and poor handling of environmental concerns have
imperiled the social licenses of certain oil and gas extractive
activities.151 This has led to increased regulatory scrutiny,
friction during permitting processes, citizen ballot initiatives,
proposals for rules that would require permitting agencies to
give greater consideration to environmental impacts, heightened
local regulation, and public calls to unify split estates and
radically reallocate power between surface and mineral
owners.152 Improved transparency and accountability related to
resolution of surface use disputes or use of third-party
verification metrics of compensation funds could help
companies facilitate trust and regain social license. 153 A desire
to obtain and maintain social license may encourage companies
to adopt private governance standards and contract for higher

150. Jennifer Howard-Grenville et al., Constructing the License to Operate: Internal
Factors and Their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions, 30 LAW & POL’Y 73,
77 (2008).
151. Evan J. House, Fractured Fairytales: The Failed Social License for
Unconventional Oil and Gas Development, 13 WYO. L. REV. 5, 52-56 (2013).
152. Jeffrey R. Fiske, Earning and Maintaining A Social License to Operate—An
Operator’s Perspective, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS, supra note 46, at 11C-1, 11C-2 to
11C-4; Lucas C. Satterlee, Clearing the Fog: A Historical Analysis of Environmental and
Energy Law in Colorado, 28 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 40-43 (2017); Amy Mall, It’s Time to
Eliminate Hurdles for Split Estate Landowners to Buy Federal Oil and Gas Rights, NAT.
RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL: EXPERT BLOG (May 09, 2014), https:// www.nrdc.org/
experts/ amy-mall/ its- time- eliminate- hurdles- split- estate- landowners- buy-federal-oiland-gas-rights [https://perma.cc/C73F-D9WB]; SPLIT ESTATE (Red Rock Pictures 2009),
http://www.splitestate.com/the_film.html [https://perma.cc/5KD7-RQ9R]; Martinez v.
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 2017 WL 1089556 (Colo. App. 2017),
cert. granted, 2018 WL 582105 (Colo. 2018) (Case No. 17SC297); COLORADO
SECRETARY OF STATE, In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for
Proposed Initiative 2017-2018 #178, #179, #180 and #181 “Regulation of Oil and Gas
Development,” https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/2017Initiatives.cfm
(May 15, 2018).
153.
See Melanie Bonner Bell, Land Negotiators’ View From the Field:
Maintaining Your Social License to Operate From the Landman’s Perspective, in OIL &
GAS AGREEMENTS, supra note 46, at 11A-1, 11A-8 to 11A-9, 11A-13 to 11A-14; Kate
Konschnik, Regulating Stability: State Compensation Funds for Induced Seismicity, 29
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 259 (2017); Alex Ritchie, Fracking in Louisiana: The Missing
Process/Land Use Distinction in State Preemption and Opportunities for Local
Participation, 76 LA. L. REV. 809, 854 (2016) (citing Kieren Moffat & Airong Zhang, The
Paths to Social Licence to Operate: An Integrative Model Explaining Community
Acceptance of Mining, 39 RESOURCES POL’Y 61, 61 (2014)).
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standards of performance. 154
Further, environmental and
liability insurance companies and investors may encourage
companies to adopt policies that promote social license in order
to limit business interruption risk and facilitate regulatory
entitlements.155
Private contracts providing for surface damages and
environmental protections may have little impacts on overall
market perceptions of industry practices.
An operator’s
upstream surface management practices will be readily apparent
to members of the community in which extractive activities take
place; they are unlikely to be apparent to downstream purchasers
of petroleum products. While sustainable surface management
practices are “integrative dynamic capabilities” that have the
potential to differentiate among competitors, 156 lack of
transparency downstream diminishes the link between social
license and best practices. Split estate landowners have no
choice over which companies operate on their property, and they
cannot unilaterally convey or revoke social license.
Downstream users may not be able to ascertain between
products produced using best practices and those from
companies with poor surface management policies, as products
are commingled, refined, and rebranded many times before
reaching retail markets. Even in rare cases where retail fuel
purchasers may be able to observe poor upstream environmental
performance, consumer choices and boycotts may not be
particularly effective. For example, following the Deepwater
Horizon disaster and spill, one of the largest in U.S. history,
there were widespread calls to boycott British Petroleum
products on social media.157 While boycott may be a method of
154. See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 308 (2004).
155. See, e.g., Light & Orts, supra note 131, at 42-44 (describing, among other
private efforts, “Equator Principles” reporting requirements for lenders to large-scale
infrastructure projects; various firms’ voluntary adoption of greenhouse gas disclosure
requirements in response to pressure from institutional investors; and ISO specifications for
voluntary greenhouse gas reporting).
156. Rodrigo Garcia, et al., Strategic Partnering in Oil and Gas: A Capabilities
Perspective, 3 ENERGY S TRATEGY REVIEWS 21, (2014).
157. Ron Lieber, Driving Past the BP Station, and Tilting at Windmills, N.Y. TIMES,
B1 (June 12, 2010); see also Sidharth Muralidharan et al., The Gulf Coast Oil Spill:
Extending the Theory of Image Restoration Discourse to the Realm of Social Media and
Beyond Petroleum, 37 PUB. REL. REV. 226 (2011).
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enforcement of environmental governance, 158 these efforts may
not have been particularly effective given the branding and
franchise model used by BP. 159 Public and academic suspicion
of greenwashing 160 and ambiguous crisis-communication tactics
may also diminish consumer responses to companies adopting
strong environmental practices. 161 Accordingly, an individual
company may be more likely to be influenced by industry-wide
perceptions of environmental management than by its own best
practices.
Bilateral standard setting offers the potential to increase
consumer transparency and link surface management to prosocial consumer norms.162 Bilateral standard setting occurs
where one party—in a lending or supplier agreement, for
example—includes provisions designed to reduce the
environmental impacts of the supplier’s or borrower’s
operations.163 Supply-chain contracting requirements have
already been identified as an important source of private
environmental governance. 164 Requirements set by Walmart and
Target have driven changes in packaging and toxic chemicals
and Chipotle has driven changes in food production. 165 There
are corporate reputational benefits to adopting environmentally
sustainable practices, and consumers have indicated a
158. Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance,
in DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL L AW 253, 261 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds.,
2016).
159. Lieber, supra note 157, at B1, B5.
160. See Light & Orts, supra note 131, at 67-68; see generally Magali A. Delmas &
Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54 CAL. MGMT. REV. 64 (2011).
161. Gerdien de Vries et al., Sustainability or Profitability? How Communicated
Motives for Environmental Policy Affect Public Perceptions of Corporate Greenwashing,
22 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 142, 144 (2015); Young Kim, Toward an Ethical
Model of Effective Crisis Communication, 120 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 57, 73 (2015).
162. See Michael Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect, The Role of Private
Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 916-17 (2007) (observing that
bilateral supply chain contracting is popular among sampled firms and that pressure to
impose supply-chain requirements or other bilateral standards do arise from consumer
preferences); but see id. at 959-63 (questioning the accountability of private contracting as
a governance regime).
163. Vandenbergh, supra note 122, at 147.
164. Vandenbergh, supra note 162, at 925-26.
165. Id. at 927-28; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Implications of Private
Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 117, 128 (2014); see J.C.
Swanson, The Ethical Aspects of Regulating Production, 87 POULTRY SCI. 373, 376
(2008).

400

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:2

willingness to pay for lower carbon goods. 166 In fact, there are
already retail fuel companies such as the U.K.’s Ecotricity and
Philadelphia’s Energy Co-Op that offer customers the option to
purchase “frack-free gas.”167 These same practices could apply
to upstream environmental behavior. For example, companies
with branded fuel operations such as Walmart, Safeway, and
Target could require suppliers to assure that upstream operations
meet minimum standards, thus transferring environmental
standards along the supply chain. 168 Use of the blockchain can
facilitate tracking, monitoring, and data collection. 169 By
increasing transparency and traceability, supply chain standards
focused on environmental behavior could encourage companies
to adopt sustainable upstream surface management practices and
encourage consumers to make purchasing decisions based on
environmental management practices. 170

VI. CONCLUSION
Upstream oil and gas development frequently involves
significant impact to surface land and water resources. As a
result, land use conflicts over mineral development are common.
These conflicts are amplified where surface and mineral
ownership is severed, and thus the party experiencing the
majority of environmental externalities may not be sharing in
corresponding economic benefits of development. Often, the
split-estate surface owner has no right to impede development
and may not be entitled to compensation for damages resulting
166. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 217, 222 (2015).
167. Ecotricity Promises “Frack-Free Gas,” ECOTRICITY (Sept. 27, 2013),
https://www.ecotricity.co.uk/news/news-archive/2013/ecotricity-promises-frack-free-gas
[https://perma.cc/H8M8-NJLF]; Andrew Maykuth, Energy Co-op Program Offers FrackFree Gas Alternative, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 19, 2016, 1:07 AM),
http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20160119_Energy_Co-op_program_offers_frackfree_gas_alternative.html [https://perma.cc/5764-MZH4].
168. See Su-Yol Lee et al., The Green Bullwhip Effect: Transferring Environmental
Requirements Along a Supply Chain, 156 INT’L J. PRODUCTION ECON. 39, 41-42 (2014)
(describing the “green bullwhip effect” and concluding that it might accelerate and expand
the adoption of green supply chain practices).
169. Jan Mendling, et al., Blockchains for Business Process Management –
Challenges and Opportunities, 9 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON MANAGEMENT INFORMATION
SYSTEMS 1, 1-16 (2018);
170. See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Emergence of Private
Environmental Governance, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10125 (2014).
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from oil and gas activity, provided those activities do not exceed
the scope of what is reasonably necessary to explore for and
produce the underlying minerals. Where uses are perceived as
excessive, the surface owner may bring claims of nuisance,
negligence, and trespass.
To reduce conflict and minimize transaction costs and
uncertainty, surface owners and mineral developers have
customarily contracted for terms of surface use and access. Split
estate acts adopted in the majority of oil and gas producing
states now make these negotiations, as well as some form of
compensation to the surface owner, mandatory. The resulting
surface damage agreements incorporate covenants to
accommodate the surface owner and adopt pro-environmental
behavioral practices and impose restrictions on the location or
scope of exploration and production activities. As such, surface
damage agreements are a powerful instrument of private
governance imposing restrictive, affirmative, and forwardlooking obligations on the oil and gas developer.
These agreements present an opportunity for increased
governance through utilization of independently-developed
standards and third-party verification or certification. By
increasing transparency, monitoring, accountability, and market
leveraging, companies and surface owners can drive surface
management towards sustainable best practices. Downstream
retail fuel purchasers can further amplify these efforts through
the imposition of supply chain requirements based on surface
management best practices. In so doing, landowners, energy
companies, and consumers can evolve industry customs,
practices, and understandings of reasonableness of surface use.

